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  ABSTRACT 
 
SHAREHOLDER ADVOCACY IN CORPORATE ELECTIONS:  
CASE STUDIES IN PROXY VOTING WEBSITES FOR RETAIL INVESTORS 
 
  
One of the key rights shareholders retain is the right to vote on issues affecting the 
companies in which they invest. This voting right is seen as one of the primary means of 
exercising diligent corporate governance (Cole 2003, Fairfax 2009). Only 28 percent of 
individual investors vote in corporate elections compared with 91 percent of institutional 
investors. Informed voting decisions at corporate elections can be very information 
intensive, and theories of rational apathy and the free rider problem may explain a lack of 
participation from individual investors.  
Many shareholders cannot attend annual corporate meetings, so they can use the 
proxy voting process. Several proxy voting websites have been launched to increase 
engagement among individual investors in the voting process, but most have failed. 
Through case study analysis of Moxy Vote, the United States Proxy Exchange and 
ProxyDemocracy, this research identified major hurdles in regulatory constraints and 
funding models and opportunities to engage progressive institutional investors and 
millennials. This research also explores the link between shareholder voting and corporate 
disclosure on climate change and sustainability. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Shareholder Advocacy 
Shareholder advocacy, also known as shareholder activism, encompasses a range of 
activities used to make change in a corporation, often as a reaction to underperforming 
boards and management (de Tocqueville 2015). There exist a number of triggers that drive 
shareholder activism including ineffective or misaligned strategy, poor risk management, 
poor capital management, inadequate board member qualifications, and operational 
mismanagement. The core goal of shareholder activism is to engage fellow shareholders 
and the board of directors for the purpose to bringing about necessary changes to improve 
performance and retain or grown shareholder value. It also tries to solve the fundamental 
problem of the “divergence between ownership and control” that occurs because 
shareholders entrust the control of their capital to corporate managers whose interest may 
be different from shareholders (Cole 2003).  
Research from Gillan and Starks (1998, 2007) shows that shareholder activism has 
been in place since the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted 
Rule 14a-8 in 1934. This rule allows shareholders who have held a minimum of $2,000 
worth of company shares for at least a year to submit a shareholder proposal. Under this 
rule, shareholders have the right under certain conditions to propose policies that must be 
printed in a company proxy statement, distributed to all shareholders and voted on at the 
annual shareholder meeting (Gilbert 1956). From 1934 to the mid-1980s, Gillan and Starks 
(2007) found the shareholder proposal process was almost exclusively led by individual 
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shareholders and religious or political groups. When public pension plan activism started 
in 1985, institutional investors became increasingly more involved and now seem to 
dominate the shareholder advocacy arena.  
1.2 Shareholder Voting Rights 
One of the key rights shareholders retain is the right to vote on issues affecting the 
companies in which they invest. Investors are not required to vote, but voting one’s shares 
is seen as one of the primary sources of power within a corporation and means of 
exercising diligent corporate governance (Cole 2003, Fairfax 2009). The SEC views 
corporate governance as key to maintaining a system of accountability among shareholders, 
managers and the board of directors. The corporate governance process helps determine 
the leadership, organization and direction of a company (SEC Office of Investor Education 
and Advocacy 2015). Shareholder voting can also be used to influence company activities 
related to sustainability and social responsibility (Ceres 2015, As You Sow 2015, Snow 
and Cook 2011, Newlands 2015).  
These voting rights give shareholders the power to elect directors at annual or 
special meetings and make views known to company management and the board of 
directors on significant issues that may have an affect on the value of the shares including 
mergers and acquisitions (SEC Office of Investor Education and Advocacy 2015). Due to 
the dispersed nature of shareholders, it can be difficult to amass the quorum needed to 
conduct an election, and shareholders in the current era typically vote through proxy. The 
proxy technically refers to the “shareholder’s grant of authority to a third party to case a 
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vote on the shareholder’s behalf” (Fairfax 2009). 
Regardless of the voting method, all shareholders who hold shares by a company’s 
set record date receive notification of an upcoming election or meeting by one of three 
ways: a notice either in the mail or electronically that proxy materials are available on the 
Internet; a package containing a proxy card or voter information form (VIF), annual report, 
and proxy statement; or a package containing an annual report and information statement 
but no proxy card. 
1.3 Types of Investors and Shareholders 
Institutional investors are large organizations including mutual funds, pension 
funds, labor unions or insurance companies, investment banks, commercial trusts, 
endowment funds, and hedge funds that invest large amounts of money in the stock 
exchange, typically on behalf of other people. Non-institutional investors, by definition, 
are all other investors including anyone who buys and sells debt, equity or other 
investments through a broker, bank, real estate agent or someone in a similar capacity. 
Within non-institutional investors, there is a class of investors commonly referred to as 
retail investors, who typically individual investors who actively trade stocks, mutual funds, 
bonds and other securities and manage their own money to plan for retirement, save for 
large purchases, or to pass on wealth to family members (Brunswick Group 2015). Some 
firms only designate between institutional and retail investors, but it is important to note 
that not all non-institutional investors are in reality retail investors. According to a recent 
report from Broadridge and PwC (2015) recapping the 2015 proxy voting season and seen 
	   4 
in figure 1, institutional investors held 68 percent of shares outstanding in U.S. public 
companies where as retail investors owned 32 percent of shares outstanding (Broadridge 
2015).  
 
Figure 1. Historical Share Ownership. (Broadridge 2015)  
Institutional investors vote at significantly higher rates than retail investors: 91 
percent of institutional investors voted their shares in the 2015 season and only 28 percent 
of retail investors voted their shares (see figure 2). This left more than 97 billion shares 
unvoted during the 2015 proxy season. This is an important phenomenon in the United 
States because of the dispersed nature of share ownership. As opposed to investment in 
other countries, such as Hong Kong where companies are often privately held or public 
companies have few owners, public companies in the United States are owned by many 
different individuals and entities. In the case of proxy contests where companies may be 
facing disputes about board members, shareholder proposals or mergers and acquisitions, 
votes submitted by retail investors can indeed influence the final outcome.  
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Figure 2. Historical Retail Investor Voting Rates. (Broadridge 2015) 
1.4 Proxy Voting Websites 
In the years leading up to and immediately following the financial crisis of 2008, a 
few individuals and groups sought to use the Internet as a means of promoting shareholder1 
participation in the proxy voting process (Bernard 2010). These ideas grew into several 
different websites devoted to providing shareholders with more information about the 
issues present on their proxy voting ballots and the ability to transact votes more efficiently. 
Of the several websites that were created in the United States including Moxy Vote, 
Sharegate.com, Shareowners.org, United States Proxy Exchange and ProxyDemocracy.org, 
all but one site have effectively ceased operations.2 ProxyDemocracy.com, now owned by 
the Sustainable Endowments Institute (SEI)3, is the only site that users can still access and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The terms shareholder and shareowner are used interchangeably throughout this paper, as are the references to 
2 At the time this paper was written, Sharegate.com still has a website presence but its page indicates that the company is 
“revisioning its product”. 
3 Founded in 2005 as a special project of Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, Inc, the Sustainable Endowments Institute 
(SEI) has pioneered research, education and outreach to advance resilient institutional responses to the climate crisis.  
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where data is current and still actively being populated. Three case studies were completed 
in this research focusing on two of these sites that failed—Moxy Vote and the United 
States Proxy Exchange—and the one that still functions—ProxyDemocracy. The purpose 
of the research is to learn from the failed sites for the strengthening and future viability of 
ProxyDemocracy; in particular, to focus on the strengths and weaknesses of each operation 
and how they related to relevant changes in Proxy Democracy. Next is a brief overview of 
the three sites chosen for case study analysis. 
Moxy Vote was a web-based platform founded in 2009 by leaders of TFS Capital, 
an employee-owned independent advisory firm that provides portfolio management 
services to investment funds. Moxy Vote’s headquarters were in West Chester, 
Pennsylvania and at its peak the company employed ten staff members. Key to Moxy 
Vote’s mission was providing a simple platform that allowed the free exchange of 
information among shareholders, advocate groups, and public companies (Change.org 
2012). Moxy Vote founders created the site to “give shareholders a voice in the 
boardrooms of companies they own ”(Cheesman 2010). Moxy Vote allowed users, who 
were predominately retail investors, to create customized voting profiles that aligned with 
advice from advocate organizations, public companies and fellow shareholders. When an 
annual shareholder meeting came up, Moxy Vote allowed the option to transact votes on 
behalf of users according to their specified voting preferences. Moxy Vote essentially 
provided the same electronic voting platform available to institutional investors through 
firms such as Broadridge (though its “Proxy Edge” platform), Institutional Shareholder 
Services and Glass Lewis. Moxy Vote gained a successful following with 197,000 
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registered users and 56 advocate organizations posting proxy voting advice. Moxy Vote 
ceased operations in 2012 because of regulatory barriers and funding challenges. 
Glyn Holton, a financial risk consultant based in Cambridge, started the United 
States Proxy Exchange (USPX) in 2004. USPX was a nonprofit organization with a 
website presence at proxyexchange.org that helped train investors to file shareholder 
resolutions themselves. Holton worked with lawyers to draft templates of letters and 
resolutions that users could send to companies in which they invest. USPX ceased 
operations in 2012 because of time constraints of its volunteer founder and manager. 
The idea for ProxyDemocracy.org (ProxyDemocracy) began in 2004 when Andy 
Eggers, at the time a research assistant at the Harvard Business School, took an interest in 
the writings of Mark Latham. Latham’s ideas focus on technological solutions to the 
problems of shareholders’ collective action (Eggers 2008c). Eggers took inspiration from 
Latham’s vision that shareholders could elect a ‘corporate monitor’ that would paid with 
by corporate funds, meaning that shareholders would all be collectively paying for this 
service. The ‘corporate monitor’ would investigate the performance of the board and senior 
management and report back to shareholders with the goal of reducing the free rider 
problem inherent in proxy voting (Eggers 2008c). Early seeds of the project involved 
volunteer help from Egger’s friends who were familiar with programming. When the 
project proved concept, Eggers secured a small amount of funding to hire a professional 
website developer (Eggers 2008b). In 2006, ProxyDemocracy was incorporated as a 
nonprofit organization with an initial mission to “provide a set of tools to help investors 
use their voting power to produce positive changes in the companies they own” 
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(ProxyDemocracy.org 2008). The site gained popularity after its initial launch receiving 
recognition for its innovative approach to engaging small shareholders. What Eggers 
thought would be a brief before starting his doctoral studies turned into a website that still 
functions today. The Sustainable Endowments Institute (SEI) acquired ProxyDemocracy in 
2014, and SEI is currently exploring short and long-term options for the site’s future 
developments. 
  2. Methodology 
Research for this paper was completed in two stages: a literature review and the 
composition of three case studies. To complete the literature review I consulted a body of 
work in corporate law, shareholder advocacy, proxy voting, effects of the Internet on 
voting behavior, and recent reports on the integration of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) data into investment decisions. This research was done primarily 
through online research in LexisNexis, relevant journals, leading organizations and thought 
leaders in the corporate governance field. I also consulted books on corporate governance 
as well as blogs, newspaper articles and other informal sources.  
The three case studies were completed through interviews and secondary research 
on Moxy Vote, the United States Proxy Exchange and ProxyDemocracy.org. Although 
there were several websites launched with similar missions of engaging retail investors in 
the proxy voting process, many of these sites no longer function. The three sites were 
chosen for cases study analysis because of the availability of information, access to users 
who could provide relevant details, and the difference in their operational models. Moxy 
Vote was a for-profit entity, USPX was completely volunteer driven, and ProxyDemocracy 
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was historically its own nonprofit entity. Founders of Moxy Vote and 
ProxyDemocracy.org were interviewed and consulted throughout the drafting of the case 
studies which took place between August 2015 and January 2016. The interviews were 
supplemented by a review of news articles, blog posts, social media and shareholder 
forums to add to the narrative of the case studies. From these case studies, general 
conclusions were drawn on the similarities and differences of the websites to develop 
recommendations for ProxyDemocracy going forward.  
Next is the literature review of the following areas: efficient information gathering 
and proxy advisors, the effect of the Internet on proxy voting, rational apathy and the free 
rider problem, and the linkages of proxy voting, corporate sustainability and climate 
change.   
 
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Efficient Information Gathering and Proxy Advisors 
 Making informed voting decisions for corporate elections is an information-
intensive activity. There are often many issues for vote on a corporate election ballot 
including board of directors, CEO compensation, and a myriad of shareholder proposals. 
The proxy voting process can be quite complex as shown by figure 3, which displays the 
flow of proxy materials depending on the type of investor. 
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Figure 3. The Flow of Proxy Materials. (Securities and Exchange Commission 2010)  
Michael Schouten (2010) wrote about four key mechanisms of voting efficiency 
including: informed voting, rational voting, independent voting and sincere voting. These 
mechanisms often guide the ways that shareholders approach the effort they impart in 
making their decisions. Institutional investors commonly rely on proxy advisory firms 
including Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis to provide guidance on 
how to vote on ballot issues. Schouten likens the corporate voting process to stock trading, 
which also aggregates information on estimated values. Reducing information asymmetry 
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is key to empowering shareholders to engage in corporate voting, but cost and legal 
constraints can present major barriers (Schouten 2010). This means that there are trade-offs 
inherent in how shareholders gather information to make decisions about corporate 
elections.  
Proxy advisory firms emerged from the need to solve these issues of information 
asymmetry. There have been many firms who serve the role as proxy advisors but the two 
dominant organizations are now ISS and Glass Lewis. Proxy Governance, Inc (PGI) closed 
in 2010 citing that company responses to shareholder proposals are too often determined 
by a desire or need to conform to the voting policies of the two main proxy advisors—ISS 
and Glass Lewis—than to actually addressing the substance of shareholder concerns. 
Barrall and Nathan (2011) question whether the opinions of these firms are based on a 
thorough analysis of the facts and circumstances of each company they review in the 
context of each voting decision. These firms are responsible for providing proxy research 
and voting recommendations for tens of thousands of companies within a narrow window 
of the proxy voting season each year (Barrall and Nathan 2011). The authors criticize the 
opaque tendencies of proxy advisory firms in their methodology and the inability to test for 
accuracy, consistency and value creation.  
There exist proposals to reform disclosure requirements for proxy advisory firms to 
include conflicts of interest and to disclose the fiduciary duty that these firms have to their 
clients since they are technically investment advisors under the Advisors Act of 1940 
(Edelan 2013). Proxy advisory firms receive compensation for their guidance from 
companies who wish to provide information to their investors. Given many of these trends, 
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there may be an opportunity for an organization to emerge that better serves the needs of 
smaller institutional investors and individual investors. 
3.2 Rational Apathy and the Free Rider Problem 
As mentioned before, investors are not required to vote in corporate elections, but 
this vote is a right given to investors in order to provide a way for shareholders to have a 
voice, especially when they sense that the board and management may not be acting in the 
best interest of shareholders and share value. The 2015 Broadridge proxy season wrap-up 
shows that although retail investors own 32 percent of U.S. publically traded company 
shares, they are only voting their shares 28 percent of the time (Broadridge 2015). This 
section presents theoretical reasons why this rate is much lower than institutional investors 
who vote their shares 91 percent of the time. The two main concepts are rational apathy 
and the free rider problem. 
Rational apathy refers to the situation where the cost to shareholders of informing 
themselves about specific corporate issues and casting a vote in opposition of 
management’s opinions exceeds the expected or actual benefit gained from voting (Fairfax 
2009). If a shareholder acts in a rational manner and sees no benefit from this choice, either 
perceived or actual, the shareholder may exercise apathy and not put the effort into voting 
(Cole 2003). Similarly, the free rider problem stems from the realization that a shareholder 
can benefit by simply relying on the actions of other shareholders, which in turn, 
undermines the incentive for shareholders to take action on their own (Fairfax 2009). Cole 
(2003) give the example of two shareholders with equal percentages of ownership in a 
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company; each shareholder could invest a modest sum, say $25,000 to research the 
corporate ballot issues and still increase their shareholder value. However, each would 
prefer that the other make the research expense and gain a free ride on the information 
produced by the other. Because shareholders benefit collectively, on a per share basis, each 
individual shareholder has the incentive to let another shareholder undertake the 
information gathering costs associated with voting. This also relates to the Downsian 
analysis of shareholder voting (Edelan 2013). 
Mark Latham, a financial economist and founder of VoterMedia.org, started 
writing about issues of rational apathy and the free rider problem within corporate 
governance in the late 1990s. Latham envisioned that the Internet and innovative 
technology access would transform the landscape of shareholder engagement and provide 
vehicles to combat rational apathy and the free rider problem. Latham believes that the 
hurdles to collective action can be overcome to help shareholders monitor and hold 
corporate management accountable to shareholders (Latham 1999). Latham’s thought 
leadership was the basis for the development of ProxyDemocracy.org. Many other 
researchers and practitioners have written about the need to find solutions to overcome the 
barriers to collective action (Gulinello 2010, Eiben 2009, 2012, Fairfax 2009). The SEC 
now legally allows the use of electronic shareholder forums and virtual participation in 
shareholder meetings to provide both alternative means to gather information and more 
effectively participate in corporate elections. 
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3.3 Effect of the Internet on Proxy Voting 
Investors have been able to vote proxies on the Internet since 1998 when ADP, the 
firm that managed the mailing of hard-copy proxies for most large U.S. corporations, 
launched www.proxyvote.com (Latham 2000). Broadridge now administers this site, and 
there exist other means of transmitting proxy votes through the Internet by smaller firms. 
The SEC’s universal e-proxy rules approved in 2007 allow companies the additional 
option to either send the full package of proxy materials to a shareholder or simply just a 
notice with proxy materials posted on a publically accessible website. Sites like 
proxyvote.com and the subsequent e-proxy rules allow shareholders to access their proxy 
materials by entering the control number that they receive on the notice from the pre-
meeting disclosure documents. On this site, users can view materials and sign for future 
electronic delivery of all materials.  
Recent advances in technology can certainly play a role in facilitating this 
engagement, but some argue that the rules and regulations governing corporate elections 
have not advanced at the pace necessary to facilitate an efficient and effective system. The 
current system of voting online discourages shareholders from participating because the 
it’s not being used in the ways that most people interact with the Internet – namely to 
aggregate and customize information in a format most convenient to the shareholder 
(Eiben 2012). Larry Eiben, a co-founder of Moxy Vote, made a comparison between the 
current proxy voting process and Netflix by painting this picture: imagine if Netflix did not 
let its users aggregate information about their preferences for movies but instead required a 
user to first go online to order an individual movie when desired and then refused to let 
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users maintain lists of saved preferences to refer to when they are thinking about their next 
selection or to see what others with similar preferences to theirs are watching. This would 
not be viewed as an efficient system given the type of technology we have today; however, 
this is essentially how the online proxy voting process works for retail investors. 
The main benefits of transitioning to using the Internet are the potential cost 
reductions from mailing proxy documents to eligible shareholders (Cole 2003). In 2008, 
the SEC adopted rules that facilitate the use of electronic shareholder forums (Fairfax 
2009). Proxy rules typically require that solicitation of proxies be accompanied by filing a 
proxy statement, which means it needs to be distributed to all shareholders, which is costly, 
expensive and cumbersome for shareholders. These amendments allow communication in 
electronic forums to be exempt form these proxy rules; this facilitates better 
communications not only among shareholders, but it also fosters genuine dialogue between 
corporations and their shareholders that can be more beneficial than just corporate 
elections. The use of electronic shareholder forums also lowers the cost to collective action 
so that shareholders can assess other shareholders’ opinions on various actions but also 
enable shareholders to cultivate coalitions around specific issues as they arise. The 
drawbacks to electronic shareholder forums involve the voluntary nature of hosting or 
engaging in a forum, the risk that these forums could just turn into chat rooms be infiltrated 
by spam or unrelated posts if not carefully monitored, both of which reduce the value 
gained by users (Smith 2008). Also, these forums may actually stifle communication 
among shareholders and companies since corporations cold avoid interacting with 
shareholder by ignoring emails; they cannot avoid addressing questions if they are posed in 
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person at a meeting (Fairfax 2009).  
Examples of electronic shareholder forums include The Shareholder Forum, Moxy 
Vote, which allowed shareholders, activists and advocate organizations to share 
information regarding issues of upcoming corporate elections and the United States Proxy 
Exchange, which allowed shareholders to voluntarily represent one another at shareholder 
meetings given geographical constraints. 
3.4 Proxy Voting, Corporate Sustainability, and Climate Change 
There exists a need for shareholders to have a voice in the boardroom especially in 
light of the financial crisis in 2008 and now with risks of climate change and fossil fuel 
volatility starting to have an effect on shareholder value (Covington and Rogers 2015, 
Gelles 2016). Many organizations including Ceres, As You Sow, the Croatan Institute, the 
UN Principles for Responsible Investing, and the Forum for Sustainable and Responsible 
Investment (commonly referred to as US SIF) collect data about what companies are doing 
to invest in sustainability which will be a guiding force to protecting shareholder value 
from the risks of climate change (Ceres 2015, Electris et al. 2014, As You Sow 2015, US 
SIF 2015, Deutsche Bank Group 2012). 
Having a voice in the boardroom is important for both institutional and retail 
investors. Analysis from Proxy Insight of the 2015 proxy season revealed that many of the 
world’s largest investment management firms including Vanguard, BlackRock, and 
Goldman Sachs voted with corporate management 90 percent of the time (Havelock 2015). 
This raises concerns about whether these institutional investors are acting on the best 
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interests of their clients. Additionally, a joint study in 2011 from the Ceres Investor 
Network on Climate Risk (INCR) found that some of these same funds did not display the 
type of voting behavior on proposals related to climate change that they committed to 
(Fleming 2012). This came after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued 
formal guidance in 2010 requiring publicly traded companies to disclose material climate 
risks in their financial filings. From the retail investor perspective, a study in 2015 by the 
Brunswick Group surveying 801 retail investors4 found that 77 percent indicate they feel 
that U.S. companies are holding more cash than ever on their balance sheets and should be 
doing more to give back to shareholders. Additionally, 74 percent of respondents agreed 
that shareholder activism adds value to companies by pushing corporate management to 
make key decisions they might not be willing to make otherwise (Brunswick Group 2015). 
 Despite inaction by some institutional investors, many progressive institutional 
investors have been paving the way for the integration of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) factors in corporate elections. These investors include investment firms 
like Walden Asset Management and Boston Common Asset Management; mutual fund 
companies such as Calvert Investments and Domini Social investments; foundations and 
faith based investors including members of the Interfaith Center for Corporate 
Responsibility (ICCR); municipal and state pension funds including CalPERS, CalSTRS, 
New York State, New York City, the State of Connecticut, and the State of Vermont; and 
trade unions such as the ALF-CIO and AFSCME (Smith 2016, Ceres 2014).	  Many of these 
investors propose shareholder resolutions to bring specific issues onto a company’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Retail investors were defined as individual investors that actively trade stocks, mutual funds, bonds, etc. outside of 
retirement funds or real estate investments, and who play an active role in decision-making about their investments.  
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election ballot. Under the environmental category, climate change has taken center stage 
with proposal related to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction strategies, energy 
efficiency and renewable energy goals. For example, Walden Asset Management 
encourages companies to adopt robust climate policies and science-based GHG goals, 
consistent with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports. Other 
prominent environmental issues include water risk, hydraulic fracturing, use of toxic 
materials, recycling and waste management. A few examples of successful engagement 
with companies include Qualcomm’s announcement of a new target of 30 percent absolute 
reduction in GHG emissions from global operations relative by 2025 relative to 2014 
levels; Costco Wholesale committing to keeping GHG emissions growth to less than sales 
growth over the next 5 years with links to both IPCC standards and reporting to CDP, a 
leading global repository of corporate responses to climate risk; and PNC Financial 
Services adopting a more stringent mountain top removal financing policy and an 
enhanced due diligence process in financing high-risk sectors that includes internal 
environmental stress tests (Smith 2016). These types of shareholder resolutions are on the 
rise as seen by figure 4 from a recent report by Ceres and FundVotes, and figure 5 from the 
Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility’s member base of resolutions. This means 
that shareholders, if they choose to vote, will see these resolutions on their ballot and can 
signal to companies that they indeed want greater disclosure and action towards addressing 
the risks from climate change. 
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Figure 4. Shareholder Resolutions Related to Climate Change. (Ceres 2015) 
	  
Figure 5. Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility Member Resolutions. (ICCR 2016)  
 Social topics addressed by investors include: fostering best practices with equal 
employment opportunity policies, human rights risk assessment and management, political 
spending and lobbying transparency, and labor standards throughout company supply 
chains. Governance issues addressed by investors include the right to nominate directors 
(known as proxy access), the separation of the Board Chair and CEO roles, and board 
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composition diversity. 
 Investors in other countries, most notably Canada and the UK, are also leading the 
charge on incorporating sustainability and climate change issues onto the corporate ballot. 
Suncor Energy Inc, a Canadian integrated energy company, actually recommended that 
voters approve a shareholder resolution that Suncor provide ongoing reporting on how it is 
assessing and ensuring long-term corporate resilience in a future low-carbon economy 
(Suncor Energy 2016).5 This is the result of long-term engagement by shareholders with 
the company, but it is groundbreaking that the company itself is bringing the issue of 
resilience in a future low-carbon economy to shareholders.  
From this literature review, we have seen that the proxy voting process is 
information intensive, and that retail investors face issues of rational apathy and the free 
rider problem as barriers to voting. The Internet holds promise for improving the way that 
investors can gather information and more effectively participate in the proxy process. 
Additionally, investors, especially institutional investors, are starting to make more impact 
with their investments through shareholder resolutions related to climate change, 
sustainability and social responsibility. The next section will unpack the case studies of the 
three websites chosen for analysis in this research.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The full resolution states: Be it resolved that: “Suncor provide ongoing reporting on how it is assessing, and ensuring, 
long-term corporate resilience in a future low-carbon economy. Specifically, reporting could be stand-alone or integrated 
into current company reporting mechanisms and could address Suncor’s technology pipeline, emission reduction targets 
and performance, innovation and energy diversification strategies, provide a narrative on any stress-testing done against 
external low carbon scenarios (e.g. IEA’s 450 and 2¹C Scenarios), and other relevant strategies.” 
	  
	   21 
4. Case Studies 
 
This section reviews case studies for three different websites originally catered to 
retail investors to help individual essentially outsource their voting decisions to institutions 
or activist groups they trust. For each case study, there are subsections detailing the site’s 
primary functions, user base, financing and revenue generation, and a brief discussion of 
the hurdles each site faced along the way. 
4.1 Moxy Vote 
Site Functions 
1) Research and information exchange 
Users could research companies to view upcoming shareholder meetings and online 
voting duration. Users could input the control number from their proxy ballot or search by 
individual companies. Company pages displayed how many shareholder and board 
proposals were on the ballot and which board members were up for reelection. Users could 
also see opinions from activist shareholders and advocacy organizations to inform their 
voting decisions (see Appendix A for homepage). 
 
2) Voting preference customization and user directed electronic voting 
In addition to providing a platform of information exchange, users of Moxy Vote 
could create customized voting profiles based on their own opinions and those informed by 
input from advocate and activist organizations. For example, a user could align with the 
voting preferences of a particular advocate group or mutual fund and create a hierarchy for 
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voting (i.e. vote as Sierra Club, if Sierra Club has not posted an opinion on a particular 
issue, vote as the Humane Society). When the annual shareholder meeting approached for 
a stock in a user’s portfolio, users could vote online directly through Moxy Vote or tell 
their brokerage firm to direct the stocks they own to Moxy Vote’s voting platform. The 
process was relatively straightforward with a one-time set-up. This small investment in 
time could end up being of long-lasting value to the user. This voting process is a potential 
solution to rational apathy and the free rider problem by making it easy for a user to 
transact a vote and taking away a bit of the burden of deciding how to vote in an 
information-rich world. When Moxy Vote closed in 2012, investors had voted 30,000,000 
shares through the site. Shareholder activist, Jim McRitchie, claims that Moxy Vote 
provided the closest version yet to a system of client directed voting (CDV) (Kissane 
2007). This term was coined in 2006 by Stephen Norman, former Secretary and Corporate 
Governance Officer at American Express who worked on the topic with the NYSE’s Proxy 
Working Group; CDV is seen as a method to encourage greater participation from retail 
investors, but support for CDV has wavered as seen in discussions on Harvard Law 
School’s Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Hirst 2010, Wilcox 
2010, McRitchie 2010). 
 
3) Crowdsourcing of shareholder activism 
Moxy Vote allowed activist shareholders including hedge funds, unions and 
nonprofit organizations, to garner support online from individual shareholders by putting 
their opinions on the site for individual investors to see (Blumenthal 2012). These 
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shareholders could see how activist groups voted on proxy issues such as mergers and 
acquisitions and board seats. One such example revolved around Google’s acquisition of 
ON2 Technologies (ON2) in 2009. As a Bloomberg BusinessWeek article documents, 
Google announced the acquisition of the video compression software company before 
securing approval by shareholders. A group of investors, angered by what they felt was an 
undervalued offer, started directing investors to Moxy Vote to advocate for a better 
valuation of ON2’s shares. The push seemed successful, given that the merger failed to 
pass in its initial shareholder meeting, causing Google to add 15 cents per share to its offer. 
This boosted the valuation from an initial bid of $106 million to $133 million, a total 
increase of $18 million. It also gave shareholders more time to consider the merger 
(Bogoslow 2010). Shareholders in this case did not exclusively credit Moxy Vote for the 
achievement, but John Marcoux, who at the time owned nearly one million shares of ON2 
and led the efforts to collaborate with other investors on Moxy Vote, gave praise to the 
platform that allowed shareholders to “come together and speak our voice”. Marcoux said 
that that Moxy Vote’s role in their efforts “got the attention of Google that this [deal] 
wasn’t going to pass unless [Google] did something” (Bogoslow 2010). 
 
User Base 
Moxy Vote’s initial target user base included both retail investors who would sign 
up as registered users or subscribers and activist organizations that could register as 
advocates on the site. Moxy Vote’s user base reached a milestone in 2011 with 5,000 
registered users and approximately 40 advocates then the user base grew to approximately 
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200,000 registered users or subscribers and 56 advocates by the time it ceased operations 
in 2012 (Schlegel 2016).  
Moxy Vote had staff members tracking all of these metrics. Mark Schlegel, one of 
Moxy Vote’s co-founders, mentioned that Moxy Vote started with the goal of pooling 
individual who were passionate about various issues including the environment, animal 
welfare, labor relations, and providing a platform for them to vote altogether. Founders of 
Moxy Vote thought that this user base would increase enough so that the site could easily 
entice activist organizations including Sierra Club, the Humane Society and others to pay 
to participate on the site as advocates so that they can provide useful information to these 
passionate votes.  
In attempts to boost the user base early on, Moxy Vote partnered with Care2.com 
and Change.org. Moxy Vote was able to track growth in the user base for letters that were 
sent out and also noted the organic growth from the promotion, but it ultimately did not 
gain the following from those partnerships that it projected. 
Moxy Vote found out that finding people who own shares in stocks who are also 
passionate about issues was quite difficult. Moxy Vote started getting users who were not 
shareholders, but who were passionate about issues to provide information. Of the 197,000 
users, only a portion were shareholders; the rest of the users could sign letters to 
companies around issues they cared about. When Moxy Vote closed in 2012, it had sent 64 
letters to management with a collective 275,000 signatures on those letters. Notable in this 
letter writing campaign was in 2012, when as a result of a letter writing campaign from 
Moxy Vote users, Johnson and Johnson (J&J) signed an agreement with Moxy Vote that it 
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would compensate Moxy Vote for all the votes, per ballot, that came through the site. This 
goes against traditional theory that corporations do not encourage shareholders to vote 
beyond the minimum SEC compliance standards unless there is a contested election. J&J 
recognized that it would have to deal with adverse shareholders at any rate, and the 
arrangement that J&J made with Moxy Vote allowed representatives from the company to 
communicate with users of Moxy Vote who signed letters, improving the overall dialogue 
between the company and its stakeholders. 
  
Financing and Revenue Generation 
The website was initially backed with $2 million of seed funding from the owners 
of TFS Capital who collectively funded the project. Much of this initial funding was spent 
to develop the technology to connect to brokerage firms. This amount, however, is 
miniscule compared the amount of money that proxy advisory firms like ISS and Glass 
Lewis spend to develop their systems. The Moxy Vote funders invested a total of $4.5 
million into the venture. To generate ongoing revenue for the site, Moxy Vote charged fees 
to institutions with an interest in reaching users of the site. These institutions included 
public companies, activist hedge funds and pension funds who wanted to lobby for votes 
from retail investors and individual shareholders (Kerber 2012). 
In another attempt to generate revenue, Moxy Vote ran a pilot program with SRI 
(socially responsible investment) and ESG (environmental, social and governance) wealth 
managers to vote their proxies for them, essentially providing proxy advisory services 
outside of ISS and Glass Lewis. The pilot ran its course, but in the end, the wealth 
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managers decided to move in a different direction from working with Moxy Vote.  
 
Regulatory Hurdles: Why Moxy Vote Ceased Operations 
Moxy Vote worked closely with SEC staff through the initial start-up and 
expansion of the site; however, Moxy Vote ended up facing barriers with regulations that 
prevented the long-term viability of the site. This led to the decision to suspend operations 
in July 2012. There were two main regulatory considerations: 1) the classification of the 
company in the context of proxy and financial advisors and 2) the costs related to voting 
transactions fees. 
In the first regulatory consideration, despite efforts to clarify Moxy Vote’s role, the 
company ultimately found that it did not fit any of the classifications of investment 
advisors recognized by the SEC since it was an aggregator of information and did not 
receive compensation for its advisory services. Since it did not fit strongly into any of the 
classifications some brokerage firms were not compelled not pass along shareholder ballots 
to the site, stating that they would do so when required by an SEC ruling. Individual 
shareholders have no legal grounds to compel their brokers to deliver ballots electronically 
to Internet voting platforms. This meant that some users would not be able to vote 
electronically through Moxy Vote. This discrepancy largely depended on how these firms 
read the regulations, even though Moxy Vote sent the ballot through the same secure 
system as the individual voter. 
In the second regulatory consideration, Schlegel made an analogy – imagine an 
institutional investor who owns a company in 1000 different client accounts; brokerages 
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firms charge one flat fee for one ballot for the institutional investor. Contrasting this, Moxy 
Vote has 1000 users who all own the same company; brokerage firms would not pool the 
ballots of Moxy Vote users and would charge that same flat fee for each individual ballot 
for each individual users of the site. Since Moxy Vote wanted to remain a free service to 
its registered users (different from advocates), the site paid the fees and hoped that 
revenue generated from the advocates would offset the fees. 
As Moxy Vote became more successful in attracting users, the site had to pay a 
growing amount in transaction fees to brokerage firms that were not reimbursed by public 
companies. In essence, as Jim McRitchie, shareholder-activist and publisher of 
Corpgov.net stated, "The more successful Moxy Vote was at getting people to vote on their 
platform, the more money they lost” (McRitchie 2015). For institutional brokers, these 
transaction fees are nominal in comparison with the fees they generate from providing 
proxy voting advice. Moxy Vote founders felt these fees should be reimbursed by the 
companies, or should not even be charged at all to a site like Moxy Vote, which was 
claiming to be a neutral aggregator of information. 
After Moxy Vote ceased operations, co-founder Larry Eiben filed a petition with 
the SEC seeking to create a new category of investment advisor called the “neutral Internet 
voting platform”; this platform category would have helped Moxy Vote and similar sites 
avoid the transaction fees it owed to proxy broker services in order to transact votes on 
behalf of its users. Schlegel mentioned that as they dug deeper into the regulations, they 
found that many of them were put into place over 40 years ago.  Being well before the 
Internet became mainstream, regulators and rule makers at the time had no concept that 
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there would be a more efficient way to submit their proxy vote. Schlegel also 
acknowledged when Moxy Vote was active, changing rules to make it more efficient for 
retail investors to transact their votes probably was not high on the priority list of those at 
the SEC. Moxy Vote’s founders previously worked in the finance field and were easily 
able to secure financial backing to keep pushing for changes in regulations. It inevitably 
became too challenging to keep supporting this advocacy, however, when the SEC didn’t 
appear to be moving on any action that would benefit Moxy Vote. 
No action ever came from Larry Eiben’s petition to the SEC in 2012. Schlegel 
mentioned that there have been multiple roundtable discussions with the SEC, NYSE and 
other committees that oversee the proxy voting process since Moxy Vote closed down. He 
lamented, however, that they often involve the same people and same discussions that fail 
to move forward on any item that would help an electronic shareholder forum like Moxy 
Vote be successful in the future. The concern of many of these committees and panels is 
not focused on the individual and retail shareholder, but the institutional investors. 
Moxy Vote began as a good business idea that could also do some good; the 
founders thought they saw a crossroads of being able to make a livelihood while pushing 
the ball forward on promoting engagement of shareowners in exercising their voting 
power, their corporate equivalent to democracy. Moxy Vote wanted to bring illumination 
to the process of rallying the retail vote and to “empower small shareholders to effect 
change” (Bernard 2010). Until regulatory hurdles are overcome or circumvent, it will be 
difficult for a website with similar functionality to Moxy Vote to be able to scale to the 
point needed to sustain revenue.  
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4.2 United States Proxy Exchange (USPX) 
Site Functions 
USPX provided users with letter and proposal templates to submit shareholder 
resolutions to companies. It also provided a way for users to connect with one another and 
attend annual meetings on behalf of other users of the website to directly cast their vote. In 
2006, Holton published a proposal in the Financial Analysts Journal to allow small 
shareholders to assign their proxy voting rights to anyone they wished (Kerber 2011). This 
would help address the free rider problem by allowing a means for people to pass their 
votes on to actual individuals who can share with them the result of their actions, not just a 
vote through a system where they may not know the outcome of their votes. The site 
functioned well by providing commentary on certain issues; one example is an attempt of 
Goldman Sachs Group to sell pre-IPO shares of Facebook to wealthy investors ahead of 
the anticipated IPO. Companies are supposed to file public disclosure if they have more 
than 500 shareholders, so this arrangement would be a way around this requirement. 
Holton wrote in a newsletter to USPX members that the SEC should block this 
arrangement as a violation of these disclosure rules. Goldman subsequently limited its 
private placement of these pre-IPO shares citing, “intense media coverage” (Kerber 2011). 
USPX also worked to send several sets of comments to the SEC including model 
shareholder proposals for proxy access, shareholder guidelines for say-on-pay voting, and 
comments to specific corporate cases. 
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User Base, Financing, Revenue Generation, and Governance 
In 2011, USPX had an email list of about 250 people. USPX was completely 
volunteer run with Holton leading the helm. Holton came from a quantitative background 
and was seeking to “reverse engineer what Wall Street” was doing (Kerber 2011). 
 
Management Capacity: Why USPX Ceased Operations 
In 2012, USPX ceased central operations. The intent was to take a pause for 18-24 
months to re-evaluate the direction of the website. The site was always run on a volunteer 
basis with a volunteer director and volunteer board. Holton ran his own consulting practice 
on financial risk management, which suffered because of the demands of running USPX 
(McRitchie 2012). USPX was decentralized in principle, but the site relied on Holton to 
keep the momentum going. Similar to Moxy Vote, USPX was seeking to put “new power 
in the hands of retail investors” who have the potential to reshape “the relationship 
between companies and their shareholders” through the use of online communications 
(Kerber 2011). "The system has been broken for 100 years," said Holton, "but that's no 
reason to keep it broken" (Zweig 2012). At the time this case study was written, the USPX 
webpage does not load, and it appears that the site never came back after its pause in 2012. 
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4.3 ProxyDemocracy.org 
Site Functions 
1) General news and information about proxy voting for individual investors 
ProxyDemocracy has a section where users can view general news and information 
about proxy voting. Site moderators posted some articles, and some were linked in through 
other blogs, news sources and user-created content. The news sections have not been 
updated since 2013. There is also a section for users to learn about proxy voting in general 
and a few of the key issues involved in shareholder elections. 
 
2) Individual company ballot information and alerts of upcoming meetings 
ProxyDemocracy users can create a profile on the site and sign up to receive alerts 
of upcoming shareholder meetings. This, in combination with the information about proxy 
voting, can help combat rational apathy and the free rider problem by reminding the user to 
vote, and making the information gathering a bit easier. Users can search by individual 
companies to view the ballot information for a particular meeting including what board 
members are up for election and key shareholder proposals. ProxyDemocracy tracks 
meetings for 13,000 individual companies. 
 
3) Mutual fund voting records and activism profiles 
Users can learn about mutual fund voting records and see ProxyDemocracy’s 
activism profile, which provides an algorithmic rating system based on a mutual fund’s 
voting record. To create the activism profiles, ProxyDemocracy scrapes NPX filings from 
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the SEC’s database of mutual funds proxy voting records, and these filings are run through 
an algorithm that creates the fund’s activism profile seen on the site. This profile provides 
quantitative percentiles and rankings as well as a graphic display of the activism footprint. 
The activism profile is based on four key areas related to issues addressed in proxy voting: 
Directors, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Impact. This 
allows users to see how mutual funds compare to one another in addressing certain 
corporate governance issues or to see if a particular mutual fund they own aligns with the 
values of the shareholders. ProxyDemocracy provides information and activism profiles 
about 60 fund families and 182 mutual funds. 
 
User Base 
ProxyDemocracy’s initial target audience was retail investors (Eggers 2008a). The 
site targets information and functionalities for shareholders of individual companies and 
mutual fund owners. In an interview with Andy Eggers, the founder of the site, he 
mentioned his target user base as people who care about social issues or who may think 
that there is a lot of corporate malfeasance, for example, that the levels of corporate 
compensation are too high. The site was designed for someone who wants to make 
decisions about their proxy votes, but does not want to do all the work to keep up to date 
with everything in the shareholder advocacy universe. In a way, ProxyDemocracy could 
serve like a political party for investors. The hope was that “broader and more informed 
participation will not only help investors safeguard their own investments, but also bring 
about economically and socially beneficial change" (Odell 2008).  
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Financing, Revenue Generation, and Governance 
ProxyDemocracy received initial funding from the Panta Rhea Foundation, the 
Nathan Cummings Foundation, the V. Kann Rasmussen Foundation, the General Service 
Foundation and the Noyes Foundation (ProxyDemocracy.org 2008). The site worked on a 
very minimal structure with Eggers leading the strategic direction along with input from 
the small board of directors. Eggers shared website development responsibilities with 
Anandaroop Roy, a web developer and designer based in New York City. In total, the site 
raised less than $200,000, mostly in increments of $10,000-$30,000. 
The board of directors was first composed of Mark Orlowski, the Executive 
Director and Founder of the Sustainable Endowments Institute; Nicco Mele, the co-
founder of Echo and Company; and Mark Latham, the director of VoterMedia.org. These 
board members had the necessary knowledge and connections to help ProxyDemocracy 
gain initial popularity. ProxyDemocracy still exists but is now under management of the 
Sustainable Endowments Institute in Boston. ProxyDemocracy began as an idea likened to 
being a political party for investors – to provide easier access to information in a format 
that is more user friendly and engaging than what is provided by companies and the proxy 
advisors they use to solicit votes.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
From these case studies, there are apparent hurdles to implementing an effective 
website catered to the needs of retail investors, but there exist ample opportunities to 
overcome these hurdles. Table 1 summarizes the comparison between the three case 
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studies, and next I will unpack some of hurdles of the sites as well as the subsequent 
opportunities. These two aspects are incorporated into the overall recommendations for 
ProxyDemocracy in the next section. 
 
Website   Moxy  Vote   USPX   ProxyDemocracy  
Years  Active   2009-­‐2012   2004-­‐2012   2006-­‐Current  
Site  Functions  
Information  exchange    
Proxy  voting  platform  
Shareholder  resolution  training  
Social  network  for  corporate  meetings  
Information  exchange  
Activism  profiles  for  mutual  funds  
User  Base  
200,000  users,  retail  investors  
56  advocate  organizations  
250  users,  retail  investors   Unclear  amount,  retail  investors  
Management  
For  profit  
10  paid  staff  
Volunteer-­‐run  
1  volunteer  director  
Non  profit  
2  paid  staff  
Strengths  
Strong  user  base  
Connection  with  Broadridge  
Expertise  of  staff  in  finance  
Mission  driven    
Knowledge  &  expertise  of  director  
Connections  with  legal  advisors  
Innovative  concept  
Technical  expertise  of  staff  
Website  design  &  automated  algorithm  
Hurdles  
Regulatory  issues  
Inability  to  generate  revenue  
Operating  expenses  
Management  capacity  
Small  user  base  
Limited  functionality  
Grant  dependent  
Unclear  target  user  and  website  traffic  
Outdated  appearance  
 
Table 1. Comparative Summary of Case Studies. Robin Miller, 2015. 
	  
5.1 Hurdles 
The major hurdles fall into a few different themes: regulatory concerns, funding 
and financing, and the fragmented system of websites. Many of these hurdles exist because 
the rules on proxy voting were developed long before the mainstream adoption of the 
Internet; it appears that the SEC has failed to adequately keep up with adapting its rules to 
the changing environment.  
Regarding regulatory hurdles, the adoption of a neutral voting platform by the SEC 
would greatly aid in allowing a website with a customized voting platform to operate a 
sustainable business model. Requiring greater transparency on the part of the proxy 
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advisors’ methodologies and restricting the ability of proxy advisors to provide consulting 
services to issuers would help the entire proxy system avoid conflicts of interest and 
promote greater accessibility to and transparency of information (Schouten 2010).  
Even though each of the websites had a different management structure and 
operating model, none of them developed a successful revenue model with diversified 
revenue streams. Moxy Vote relied on receiving significant seed funding from the founders, 
but this funding was quickly used in the website development, and the revenue streams 
from the advocate organizations was not enough to keep up with the transaction costs per 
ballot. USPX was completely volunteer managed so although its mission was serving a 
needed purpose, the volunteer nature of the site would probably never have scaled much 
beyond its user base. ProxyDemocracy has historically been grant funded, but even then, it 
has not seen any recent attention and remains outdated in design and content. 
Having several websites all catered to encouraging the retail investor vote resulted 
in a fragmented market. This caused a bit of tension among the sites as they were all 
iterating around the time period. Schlegel mentioned that Moxy Vote had a relationship 
with the other sites that landed somewhere between collaboration and competition. Moxy 
Vote founders had conversations with Eggers of ProxyDemocracy, as well as the founders 
of Shareowners.org and Holton from the United States Proxy Exchange. Schlegel said that 
there always remained challenges of how to integrate and support one another. Moxy Vote 
was the only for-profit organization working in the space, which caused skepticism of the 
site by the other groups, who were largely based on voluntary efforts or organized into 
nonprofit organizations. Although they were all working to push the ball forward on 
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greater involvement of shareowners in the proxy voting process, the groups approached the 
task from different angles. Inevitably, it became very challenging to figure out how to 
bridge the gap for all organizations to mutually benefit. How could these nonprofit and 
volunteer ventures adequately explain being in the same sandbox as the for-profit Moxy 
Vote? From Eggers’ perspective, he found it difficult to partner with other sites whose 
missions were not completely aligned with ProxyDemocracy. Upon later reflection, he said 
the “thought they were going to lose their lunch, but there was no lunch to lose” speaking 
to the small pool of investors these sites could potentially attract (Eggers 2015). Eggers did 
not initial realize just how difficult it would be to get investors interested in doing 
something about proxy voting. He expressed a sense of overenthusiasm about how the 
Internet would solve issues of engagement and activism. Eggers mentioned that he learned 
that shareholder advocacy, and especially engaging individual shareholders, involves much 
more than creating elegant algorithms and using technology. Effective shareholder 
engagement takes “elbow grease” in to overcome the obstacles of rational apathy and the 
free rider problem. There is not a lot of natural connection between individual 
shareholders, which begs the questions, who would want to be on a social network site for 
shareholders?  
5.2 Opportunities 
 These hurdles can be reframed as opportunities to strengthen and improve the 
viability or ProxyDemocracy going forward. The major opportunities lie in thinking 
creatively about revenue streams, aligning more closely with progressive institutional 
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investors, and being aware of the impending wealth transfer to millenials. 
One potential solution to diversifying revenue streams that Schlegel proposed was 
that part of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)’s regulation specifies a paper reduction 
fee remitted to the brokerage firm for shareholders who elect to receive their proxy 
information electronically. This amount ranges from 6 cents to 25 cents per ballot 
depending on the account size of the investor (Deutsche Bank 2014). This accounts for 
electronic delivery being more efficient and requiring less printing and processing of 
paperwork. If a proxy voting site could prove that it encouraged its users to switch to 
receiving their proxy notices electronically, what is preventing that site from sharing the 
reduction fee remission with the brokerage firm? This source of revenue could offset the 
voting transaction fees and contribute to a more viable business model. Additionally, these 
sites were operating during the earlier periods of social media and crowd funding and did 
not take advantage of these opportunities to both spread the message of the site and attract 
additional investment.  
Aligning with progressive institutional investors and other key partners could also 
support the bottom line and help in the scaling of a proxy voting site for retail investors. 
Moxy Vote developed working relationships early on with the SEC and brokerage firms in 
attempts to prove the concept and make Moxy Vote function. Schlegel also acknowledged 
that Moxy Vote owed much of is success to the relationship it developed with Broadridge 
to transact votes and gain access to its database. Solidifying a significant brokerage firm 
partner will be key to success for future endeavors. Eggers suggested that a proxy voting 
site like ProxyDemocracy might be even more effective as a think tank for socially 
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responsible investment (SRI) firms and asset managers focused on environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) integration to find out what is material to retail investors voting 
decisions. This is especially important to think about with the growing number of 
shareholder resolutions related to climate change and social issues. Eggers kept 
ProxyDemocracy independent of these funds to avoid a conflict of interest since the site 
evaluates them through its activism profiles; however, there could be creative ways of 
thinking through partnerships with these firms towards a shared goal of greater retail voter 
participation. On a final note related to collaboration with institutional investors, Eggers 
suggested that having college and university endowment and nonprofit foundation voting 
records on ProxyDemocracy could be a good way to increase the data and reach of the site.   
The last opportunity to glean from these case studies is that the decision-making 
power of investments will soon transfer to a new generation: millennials. Schlegel (2016) 
noted that from his experience at TFS Capital, more and more individuals entering the 
workforce and earning income want match their values with their investments. Millennials, 
in his view, often do not even think twice about separating their values from the 
investments they make. As millennials inherit the wealth of their families and the inherent 
shareholder voting power, there may be an opportunity to engage these investors through 
ProxyDemocracy.  
Now that that the major hurdles and opportunities have been identified from the 
three case studies, especially focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of each website, the 
next section will detail specific recommendations for strengthening and increasing the 
viability of ProxyDemocracy going forward. 
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6. Recommendations for ProxyDemocracy 
In order to move beyond its self-sustaining state, ProxyDemocracy can make 
strategic improvements to increase its efficacy. In the short-term, ProxyDemocracy should 
conduct market research to identify a core user base; develop a set of internal materials 
including a clear vision, stakeholder analysis and financial plan; and modernize the website. 
It should continue to build its advisory board, which currently consists of several experts in 
corporate governance and sustainable investing. Maintaining the site under the nonprofit 
status of the SEI will allow the site to keep providing its educational content. 
At the long-term scale, ProxyDemocracy needs to develop a sustainable operating 
model. An option could be to partner with a similar organization like As You Sow (AYS), 
a nonprofit organization based in San Francisco, which completes a comprehensive annual 
report called Proxy Preview. There have been initial conversations between SEI and AYS 
to develop up a proxy voting platform similar to what Moxy Vote offered that would 
operate as a social enterprise. Revenue could come from companies who wish to use the 
service to garner votes from retail shareholders. One key idea for this incarnation is to 
develop a feedback loop so when a user votes through the platform, the user receives a 
notification after proxy season ends with the results of the elections for the companies they 
submitted votes for. This would be a crucial piece in addressing rational apathy and the 
free rider problem with proxy voting and retail investors.  
It should also increase the universe of mutual funds featured on the site, and even 
work to include proxy voting records of other types of institutions like college and 
university endowments. Table 2 provides a summary of these recommendations. 
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What   Action  Steps   Goal  of  
completion  
Market  Research   • Develop  and  implement  survey  for  
current/potential  PD  users  
• Analyze  results  
May  2016  
  
June  2016  
Internal  Materials   • Finish  brief  visioning  document  
• Stakeholder  mapping/analysis  
• Financial  plan/grant  writing  
May  2016  
May  2016  
May  2016  
Website  
Development  
• Solidify  developer  
• Complete  Tier  1  and  Tier  2  improvements  
• Back-­‐end  upload  feature  
May  2016  
July  2016  
July  2016  
Advisory  Board   • Follow-­‐up  with  Johnson  &  Johnson  
• Update  Advisory  Board  spreadsheet  
• Hold  conference  call  with  current  members  
May  2016  
Ongoing  
June  2016  
Partnerships  and  
Strategy  
• Strategy  meeting  in  NYC  
• Outreach  to  endowments/foundations    
• Explore  ProxyDemocracy  the  voting  service  
• Explore  partnerships  with  ESG/SRI  funds  
April  2016  
June  2016  
July  2016  
July  2016  
 
Table 2. Summary of Recommendations for ProxyDemocracy. Robin Miller, 2015 
 
7. Opportunities for Future Research 
There were a few limitations to this research that can be overcome in future 
research endeavors. The founder of the United States Proxy Exchange could not be reached 
for interview, which contributes to the brevity of that case study. Although there are many 
different organizations that develop proxy voting guidelines and track the results of each 
proxy voting season, it is difficult to determine the efficacy of an individual investor’s vote. 
The Croatan Institute is looking into the impact of equity engagement, and part of this 
includes the proxy voting process (Electris et al. 2014). Determining this efficacy and 
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impact will be important to integrate into further iterations of ProxyDemocracy and to the 
contribution of research on both retail and institutional investors in the future. Schlegel 
(2016) pointed out that its important to note that people in general are not completely 
apathetic toward environmental, social and governance issues. For users of Moxy Vote, the 
folks that were the most passionate about particular issues did not own those stocks and the 
folks who were shareholders tended to be the least passionate. It is the pooling of these 
interests that could really draw in synergy. Research into the synergy of shareholders and 
non-shareholder around corporate environmental, social and governance could be a very 
interesting topic.  
It is important to remember that the shareholder vote is just one piece of 
shareholder engagement and shareholder advocacy. Effective voting can signal to a 
company that shareholders desire change or information access, and additionally 
shareholder votes can often lead to beginning dialogue with a company. This dialogue is 
what usually leads to material changes that can both improve shareholder value and 
provide a path forward for action on sustainable and resilient practices.  
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Appendix A 
 
MOXY VOTE TIMELINE 
2009 Moxy Vote launches with $2M seed funding 
Nov 2009 Moxy Vote files this letter with the SEC 
March 2010 Moxy Vote publishes this video 
2011 Moxy Vote reaches 5,000 user milestone 
July 2012 Moxy Vote shuts down with 200,000 (197,000) registered users and 56 
advocate organizations posting voting advice 
Aug 2012 Larry Eiben, initial backer of Moxy Vote, files a petition with the SEC to 
create a new category of investment advisor called “neutral Internet voting 
platform” 
 
SCREENSHOT OF HOMEPAGE 
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Appendix B 
 
PROXY DEMOCRACY TIMELINE 
July 2004 Andy Eggers starts ProxyDemocracy wordpress blog 
July 2007 Alpha version of mutual fund database launched 
2007 Officially founded! (according for FB page) 
April 2008 Started blogging about FocusLists 
May 2008 Origin of the Activism Rating 
June 2009 Mark Latham gets seat on SEC Investor Advisory Committee, press release; 
first meeting notes 
March 2010 ProxyDemocracy featured in the NY Times 
2010 ProxyDemocracy gets a facelift 
November 
2010 
SEC Investor Advisory Committee terminated; did pass a resolution about 
proxy voting transparency in Feb 2010 
2012 New SEC Investor Advisory Committee created 
2015 Sustainable Endowments Institute acquires ProxyDemocracy 
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